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1 Introduction
This paper studies optimal taxation in dynamic economies with a simple form of human
capital accumulation as considered in Bull (1993). Human capital is modeled like physical
capital, with the important exception that human capital is used in the production sector
together with raw labor as one factor and can therefore, in contrast to physical capital, not be
taxed separately. Bull (1993) only showed that under an additional assumption to the utility
function setting all taxes to zero is a possible balanced growth path solution of the ﬁrst order
conditions but did not rule out the existence of other solutions. We show that in a Ramsey
equilibrium along any balanced growth path, the taxes on wage income and (physical) capital
income must be zero without the additional assumption. We point out that this result allows
for a straightforward interpretation in the spirit of the well-known zero tax results of Chamley
(1986) and Judd (1985) once one recognizes that the labor income and the consumption tax
play a diﬀerent role here compared to the setup without human capital. With the additional
assumption on preferences as imposed in Bull (1993), we extend his result by showing that
zero taxes are the only balanced growth path solution of the Ramsey problem1.
2 The Model
Representative agent There is a inﬁnitely lived representative agent in a single-good econ-
omy. The agent has preferences over consumption (public and private) and leisure time. The
utility function is time-separable and given in each period by U(c,g,n) = gZΨ(c
g,n)+X where
c is private consumption, g public expenditures, 0 ≤ n ≤ 1 time spent on working, Z > 0, X
is an arbitrary constant and Ψ is an arbitrary function. As shown by Bull (1993) this class of
utility functions is consistent with balanced growth. Physical capital, kt, and human capital,
ht, are created simply by saving a portion of output, xk
t and xh
t, until the subsequent period.








δk ≥ 0 and δh ≥ 0 are the rates at which physical and human capital depreciate. The agent´s
optimization problem is (given an initial stock of physical and human capital and bonds in
the ﬁrst period, k0, h0 and b0) to maximize utility with respect to consumption, working time,
investment into physical capital, human capital and government bonds (bt). The maximization












s.t. σtct + kt+1 + ht+1 + bt+1 ≤ (1 + (1 − τt)Wtnt − δ
h)ht
+ (1 + (1 − θt)Rt − δ
k)kt + rtbt, ∀t.
(1)
where σt the gross consumption tax (so σt = 1 means consumption is untaxed), Wt the
wage rate, τt the wage tax, Rt the capital rent, θt the capital tax and rt the gross return on
bonds. Human capital is used to produce together with raw time ¨eﬃciency units¨ of labor,
1Jones, Manuelli and Rossi (1997) consider a more complicated two sector growth model of human capital
accumulation. Note that in their model, human and physical capital are not simple substitutes produced
directly from the ﬁnal consumption good which makes their analysis diﬀerent from the one presented here.2
et := ntht. The representative agent takes prices, government spending and tax rates as given.










t+1 Ψ1(t + 1)
= β(1 − δ






t+1 Ψ1(t + 1)
= β(1 − δ
h + (1 − τt+1)Wt+1nt+1). (4)






























t−1 Ψ1(t − 1)β
−1(kt + bt). (6)
Representative ﬁrm A representative ﬁrm produces the consumption good with a constant
returns to scale production function f(kt,et). Proﬁt maximization implies:
Rt = f1(kt,ntht), (7)
Wt = f2(kt,ntht). (8)
The Ramsey Problem An allocation {kt,ht,ct,nt,gt}∞
t=0 is feasible if it fulﬁlls in all periods
the resource constraint of the economy:
ct + gt + ht+1 + kt+1 ≤ f(kt,ntht) + (1 − δ
h)ht + (1 − δ
k)kt. (9)
A competitive equilibrium consists of a feasible allocation {kt,ht,ct,nt,gt}∞
t=0, a strictly pos-
itive and bounded price system {Wt,Rt,rt}∞
t=0, and a government policy {gt,τt,θt,σt,bt}∞
t=0
such that: (i) Given the price system and the government policy: the allocation solves the
ﬁrm’s and the household’s maximization problems in each period. (ii) Given the price system
and the feasible allocation, the government policy satisﬁes the government budget constraint
in each period.
Given k0, b0 and h0 the Ramsey problem for the government is to choose a competitive equi-
librium which maximizes the utility of the representative agent.
Hence the government maximizes the utility of the agent with respect to the agent´s ﬁrst
order conditions given by equations (2)-(4), the budget constraint of the agent, the ﬁrst order
conditions of the ﬁrm and the resource constraint of the economy. Applying the primal ap-
proach to the Ramsey problem [Lucas and Stokey (1983)] the agent’s and the ﬁrm’s ﬁrst order
conditions will be used to deﬁne the tax rates {θt,τt}∞
t=0 and the prices {Wt,Rt,rt}∞
t=0. The
government can now be thought of as directly choosing an allocation {kt+1,ht+1,ct,nt,gt}∞
t=0,
the stream of government bonds {bt+1}∞





t=0, and maximizing the utility with respect to the resource constraint which3
is unchanged, the adjusted budget constraint of the agent (6) and the Euler equation for






















t Ψ2(t)nt + zt−1g
Z−1
t−1 Ψ1(t − 1)β
−1(kt + bt),
µt : ct + gt + ht+1 + kt+1 ≤ f(kt,ntht) + (1 − δ




t Ψ1(t) = zt+1g
Z−1







where βtλt,βtµt,βtνt are Lagrange multipliers associated with the constraints. We omit further
conditions that are relevant for the initial period and focus only on the periods t > 0.
3 Results
Balanced Growth Path Suppose that there is a balanced growth path with an endogenous
given non-negative growth rate ξ. From the resource constraint of the economy, the ﬁrst order
conditions of the ﬁrm and the budget constraint of the agent follows that a balanced growth
path with growth rate ξ ≥ 0 is characterized by: ξ =
f(t+1)
f(t) − 1 =
kt+1
kt − 1 =
bt+1






gt −1 and nt = n, Wt = W, Rt = R, rt = r, τt = τ, σt = σ and θt = θ.
Proposition 1 It is necessary for optimality that taxes on wage and capital income are equal
to zero along any balanced growth path: τ = θ = 0.
The optimal consumption tax is given by: σ = −W ht
gt
Ψ1
Ψ2 which does not in general imply that
the consumption tax is equal to zero (σ = 1).












Proposition 2 The consumption tax along a balanced growth path is equal to zero if and only
if condition 1 holds.
This result implies that all taxes have to be zero along a balanced growth path and government
expenditures will be ﬁnanced by the return on (negative) bonds.
4 Intuition and Conclusion
Bull (1993) only proved that under condition 1 zero taxes are a possible solution of the Ramsey
problem along a balanced growth path. We prove the more general result that under condition




θ > 0, and U(c,n,g) = ln c
g + v(n) + Z lng, for θ = 1, where v(n) is any diﬀerentiable function in n.4
1 all taxes are along a balanced growth path necessarily zero, and that even without condition
1 taxes on capital and labor income are in any case zero along a balanced growth path.
This last fact can be easily explained by noting that for the zero tax on labor income, the
same mechanism as for the zero capital income tax is at work. To see this, note that physical
and human capital are completely symmetric in this model from a technological perspective.
Hence, if it is not optimal to tax physical capital, it should also not be optimal to tax human
capital. However, the tax rate on the marginal product of human capital (which is the marginal
product of eﬃciency units of labor), is also the tax on the marginal product of raw labor, and
thus enters also in the static consumption leisure choice (see (2)). At ﬁrst sight, this seems
to make it diﬃcult to pin down the intertemporal margin for human capital accumulation
without aﬀecting the static consumption leisure choice. However, the consumption tax enters
also in (2), and thus any consumption leisure wedge can be implemented for any given wage
tax. Since the consumption tax on a balanced growth path is time invariant, it does not distort
the intertemporal margins in (3) and (4). Thus, it is possible to pin down the intratemporal
and intertemporal margins separately and the same logic as in Chamley (1986) or Judd (1985)
can be applied to see that τ = 0.
Note that here in contrast to Chamley (1986) or Judd (1985), having both labor income
and consumption taxes does not lead to an indeterminacy, but the labor income tax acts as a
tax on the return of human capital and the consumption tax is used to distort the consumption
leisure decision eﬃciently.
To see the impact of human capital, compare this model with the corresponding exogenous
growth model without human capital of Chamley (1986). The wage tax, which is equivalent
to the consumption tax in such a simple setup, is also equal to zero if and only if the following










Ψ2 which is a much stronger condition than
condition 1. If we assume for instance like in Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2004) that the disutility
of work takes a constant-elasticity form ω(n) = −ξn1+σ condition 2 is fulﬁlled for utility
functions of the form u(c,n) =
c1−θ exp[(1−θ)·ω(n)]−1
1−θ if and only if σ = −1 and hence ω(n) = −ξ
which cannot model the disutility of work. Whereas condition 1 is fulﬁlled for any diﬀerentiable
function ω(n) in n.
5 Proofs
Proposition 1:
The ﬁrst-order conditions for the government with respect to bt+1, kt+1 and zt along the balance




= β(f1 + 1 − δ
k), (10)
zt : (νt − νt−1(1 − δ
h)) = −λ(ht+1 − ht(1 − δ
h)). (11)
It follows3 that νt has to grow with the same growth rate as ht: νt
νt−1 − 1 = ht
ht+1 − 1 = ξ.
Reformulation of (11) yields νt
ht+1(1 −
νt−1
νt (1 − δh)) = −λ(1 − ht
ht+1(1 − δh)). Hence it follows
for a positive growth rate (ξ =
ht+1




3This follows from (11) by solving this diﬀerence equation for vt. Given that ht = cξt for some constant
c > 0, one can solve the corresponding ﬁrst order linear diﬀerence equation which yields the desired conclusion.5
The ﬁrst order conditions with respect to human capital are:
ht+1 : µt − µt+1(1 − δ
h + f2n)β = λσ
−1g
Z−1
t Ψ1 − λβσ
−1g
Z−1








By using equation (12) this can be rewritten as: µt − µt+1(1 − δh + f2n)β =
λ[σ−1g
Z−1
t Ψ1 − βσ−1g
Z−1
t+1 Ψ1(1 − δh) + βgZ
t+1Ψ2
n
ht+1]. The term on the right side is equal to
zero because of ﬁrst order condition (5) of the agent along the balanced growth path. Thus
the equation can be abbreviated to:
µt
µt+1
= β(1 − δ
h + f2n). (13)
The ﬁrst order conditions with respect to consumption take the following form:
ct : g
Z−1
t Ψ1 − λg
Z−1
t Ψ1 − µt + λσ
−1g
Z−2
t Ψ11(kt+1 + bt+1)
+ λ(−g
Z−1
t Ψ21n − σ
−1g
Z−2





t Ψ11 + νt−1(σ
−1g
Z−2




















has to be a constant because the term on the right side of the







comparing equation (13) with the ﬁrst order condition (4) of the agent along the balanced
growth path and equation (10) with the agent’s ﬁrst order condition (3) respectively yields:
τ = 0 and θ = 0.
Proposition 2:
The ﬁrst order conditions with respect to labor time take the form:
nt : g
Z
t Ψ2 + λ[−g
Z
t Ψ2 − g
Z





























t ] = 0.
Substituting −λ for νt
























Ψ1 − λ[Ψ1 + ct
gtΨ11]
. (15)
From the agent’s ﬁrst order condition (2) along a balanced growth path we obtain the gross











Ψ1 − λ[Ψ1 + ct
gtΨ11]
.






is exactly condition 1.6
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